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In Defense  of Fence  to Fence:  Can the
Backward  Bending  Supply Curve Exist?
Richard E. Just and David Zilberman
Politicians  dealing with  the "farm  problem"  sometimes  lament  that  output
increases  when prices  go  up and when  prices  go down.  This article presents
three possible theoretical  explanations. In the first,  farmers deplete soil (over-
farm)  when  prices are  low and imperfect  capital  markets prevent borrowing.
In the second, farmers in financial stress (low prices) allocate more family labor
to  farming to  meet debt-repayment  constraints.  In the third, wealth  held  in
farmland  tends  to  decline  as  prices  decline.  With  decreasing  absolute  risk
aversion, this increases risk aversion which, in extreme cases, causes negative
supply response.
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Introduction
A common complaint among old economists and old politicians is that farmers increase
output when prices  go up and farmers increase  output when prices  go down.  While the
former has attracted a great deal of economic research and raised the status of agricultural
economists,  the latter  has irritated  politicians  and  confounded  economists.  Both  have
been led to believe that quantity  supplied increases with price and any  other pattern of
behavior should be passed off as bad data or poor analysis.  After all, standard economic
theory teaches no alternative  to the "law of supply."
While economists  rarely make statements  in print that admit violations of the law of
supply,  Galbraith  and  Black  took this  view  for granted  in  trying  to explain  the  high
production levels that occurred during the Great Depression. Politicians are more explicit.
For example,  Senator Tom Harkin has  stated that "when price falls, the farmer goes out
and  plants  more."  On another  occasion,  this senator  further claimed that the negative
supply response for declining prices is greater than the positive supply response for rising
prices.  Paarlberg has recently underscored  the prevalence  of these views among farmers
and  policy  makers  and  their  inconsistency  with  conventional  economic  wisdom  in  a
Choices article on the "myth"  of the "backward  bending supply curve."
This article  discusses  possible theoretical  explanations  for this phenomenon  which  is
casually referenced by politicians  but likely to be uncomfortably  resisted by young econ-
omists in search of publishability.  After all, traditional practice leads any aspiring econ-
omist who estimates  a negative supply elasticity to quickly discard it. In spite of strong
prejudices  against such notions,  empirical evidence occasionally  finds its way into print.
For example,  Saez  and Shumway found negative  supply elasticities in the U.S.  for four
of ten  regions for livestock,  three of ten regions  for feed grains,  two of eight regions  for
food grains, two of seven regions for cotton, two of seven regions for oil crops, six of ten
regions for vegetables, and three of three regions for tobacco. Negative supply elasticities
have been found for dairy in Canada and  wheat in Nigeria  (Frohberg and  Kromer).  A
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study found a negative supply elasticity for rice
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in Tanzania.  (As  this  research  shows,  negative  supply  elasticities  may be  particularly
plausible for developing  countries and poor regions.)
This article  uses three separate areas of economic theory independently to show plau-
sibility of the behavior whereby farmers increase output when prices move above normal
(as usual) but also when prices move below normal, i.e., cases where both unusually high
and unusually low prices may reasonably motivate planting fencerow-to-fencerow.  These
short-run circumstances  may generate isolated data sets where negative supply elasticities
are  fully  plausible.  This article  identifies  sets of circumstances  where  negative  supply
elasticities  are  consistent  with  theory  so  that  the  plausibility  of such  findings  can  be
evaluated. In each case, very simple models are used to illustrate the principles  involved.
Obvious and more realistic generalizations  are foregone for purposes of brevity.
The  next section draws on the theory of intertemporal  decision making  to show  that
farmers  may  be induced to sacrifice  future productive  capacity in order  to increase im-
mediate income in periods of low prices.  Similarly, they may be induced to sacrifice future
productive capacity in order to make a "quick buck" in periods of excessively high prices.
The succeeding section draws on the theory of safety principles (Freund; Katoaka;  Roy)
to  examine  potential  farmer  behavior  during  periods  of financial  stress.  While  safety
principles have not been popular in the literature, they are more plausible under modem
generalizations  of utility theory (Machina;  Quiggin).  If the first priority is to meet some
debt repayment requirement,  a farmer will be willing to allocate more time to labor, thus
increasing output above normal when prices fall to very low levels and bankruptcy threat-
ens.  On the other  hand, when  debt  repayment  constraints  are not binding,  labor input
may increase with output prices following  the usual neoclassical  framework.
A third section  draws  on the theory  of decision  making under risk aversion  (Arrow)
where  wealth  is  affected  by changes  in  land prices.  As  agricultural  output price  levels
decline, land prices  decline and, as a result,  wealth of farmers declines. With decreasing
absolute  risk aversion,  this  causes  an  increase  in risk aversion  in which  case  the risk
avoidance effect can temporarily overcome the profit motive, resulting in negative supply
response.
Farm Now-Pay  Later
Consider first a two-period  model  reflecting the productive  impact  of soil regenerative
activities such as summer fallowing or crop rotation.1 In some of the more arid northern
wheat states, fallowing has accounted for about a third of the use of cropland historically.
Even in some of the most productive farming states,  secondary crops account for a major
share of farmland use because of crop rotation.  These practices are pursued to maintain
or enhance future productivity  of farmland.  However,  they also give a farmer flexibility
to increase output in the short run by reducing fallow or rotation activity with the expense
of reducing  future output.
To demonstrate  this behavior simply, let the farmer's intertemporal utility function be
given by  U(rl, ir2), where  7rl  is profit  in period  1 and  r2 is profit  in period  2.  Suppose
profit in each period t follows a restricted profit function with profit depending on output
price Pt and input prices  (suppressed for simplicity) given  acreage  At available  for pro-
duction.  Standard assumptions include drl/OPi > 0 and drx/dA, > 0. In addition, suppose
that using more acreage  for production in the first period  detracts from  productivity in
the second  period  so  that  dar 2/dA,  < 0.  For example,  acreage  can be  increased  in the
present period by foregoing fallowing which then decreases  future productivity.
The joint two-period utility maximization  problem is
max  U(7r1, tl 1),
for which first-order conditions are
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O U  dUcdhi1 dU d7r 2
(1)  a^  "a~a^  +-  - =0
aU  dUd  r2
dA2 dir2 0A2
The first condition  states that the optimal acreage  in period  1 is determined  so that the
marginal  utility of acreage  (the product  of marginal  utility of profit and marginal  profit
of land) is equal to the marginal reduction in period 2 utility because of land use in period
1. The second condition states that optimal acreage in period 2 is determined so that the
marginal utility of land use is zero.
Comparative  static analysis of this set of first-order conditions yields2
(2)  dA,  1 d2U[dU  d2ir1 d2Udrl  dal  d2U d7rldr
(2)  d  - - dP,  I  \H\A[2 L7r IaAP,  . rl  P,  A1  A  8  Prl7Ar2  P dAj,
where H is a matrix of second-order derivatives of U with respect to A1 and A2. Note that
[HI  >  0 and  d2U/OA2 < 0 when  second-order  conditions hold. Thus, the sign of (2) is
the sign of the last term in brackets.
The expression in brackets suggests that a change in output price in the first period has
three effects  on first-period acreage-one positive, one negative, and one ambiguous. An
increase  in PI  tends to increase  the value  of marginal product  of land (0d2r/dAIdP,  >  0)
and that increases acreage.  This is the familiar effect of output price under  profit maxi-
mization  in static  producer  choice  problems.  The  other two  effects  emanate  from  the
intertemporal  utility maximization  criterion. An increase  in Pi tends to increase profits
and thus reduce the marginal utility of profits in period 1 (because 02 U/7r 2 \  < 0); therefore,
the second  effect  is negative.  For the third term,  the increase  in first-period  profit  will
increase (decrease) the marginal utility of profit in period 2 if 02 U/id7rl7r 2 >  (< ) 0.
Because of the ambiguity in equation (2), some special cases can serve to illustrate the
validity of the negative supply response potential. One interesting case of backward bend-
ing supply occurs when utility is additively separable over time but marginal utility declines
rapidly.  Additive separability  of utility implies  that d2U/0d7rd 1 r2 =  0,  in which case  the
term in brackets in (2)  can be rewritten  as
0() U  0d2,  d2U/ 2 d7Pr  d7,  1l
(3)+  I
drl  LdA 1 dP l dU//dr  dP 1 j,  P-A-'
Now suppose that constant returns to scale  applies, in which  case drl/A 1 l  = irl/A1 and,
by  Hotelling's  lemma,  drl/dP 1 =  A1Y1, where  Y,  is  yield  per  acre.  Thus,  (3)  can  be
expressed as
aU
(4)  Y1 (1 -Rr),
d7rl
where Rr  -=[(02U/adr2)/(U/irl)]  r 1 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative  risk aversion
for the  first period. Note that relative  risk aversion  is used here for a riskless  problem
merely to assess plausible  curvature of the utility function  as in Turnovsky,  Shalit, and
Schmitz.  Arrow has argued that relative  risk aversion is around  1 and may plausibly be
either somewhat more or less. Clearly from (4), however, curvature associated with relative
risk aversion for first-period income greater than 1 generates negative supply response for
the first period. Arrow argues that relative risk aversion is increasing,  which implies that
the condition generating  negative  supply response for the first period tends  to occur for
producers with higher first-period income.
For another  case illustrating  the potential  of negative  supply response,  consider  the
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extreme case of preferences for income stability where profits in the two periods are perfect
nonsubstitutes  (rectangular  indifference  curves)  implied  by  U(7r,  r2) =  U[min(7r,  r2)].
(Intertemporal discounting is ignored here  assuming all variables are represented in dis-
counted terms.)  This case may be appropriate  for poor farmers or with chaotic financial
markets  where  credit  constraints  prevent  stabilizing  income  by borrowing  against  the
future in poor income  periods.  An internal  solution for this problem leads to adjusting
acreage use in the first period so that 7rl  =  r2, for which comparative  static analysis yields
dA,  _  7rl/a_  P
dP1 d7r2/OA 1 - d7l/dAl
This expression is unambiguously negative because increasing first-period use of land both
adds to first-period output and detracts from second-period output to bring profits in the
two periods into balance. Thus, given (a) imperfect capital markets that prevent borrowing
against future income and (b) preferences for intertemporal income stability, farmers will
tend  to borrow against  future productivity  by overusing land  to increase  output when
prices and incomes are low.
These cases suggest that land conservation  activities can be postponed  under prices at
either extreme. At high current prices, producers respond normally by increasing current
output.  On the other hand, if prices  fall  sufficiently,  intertemporal preferences  tilt more
strongly  toward the current  period because  of diminishing  marginal  utility.  Thus,  pro-
ducers  become more  willing  to borrow against  future  income by depleting  soil fertility
and losing the biological  benefits of rotation as current price falls too low.
Work Now-Pay  Now
Consider  next  a simple  model  where a  farmer  can attempt  to avoid  pending financial
disaster through adjustment  of family labor inputs. The development literature  has long
emphasized  the importance  of considering  explicitly  alterations in behavior  at or  near
subsistence  levels of income.  Models with various safety rules (e.g.,  safety-first or safety-
fixed)  have found  wide  applicability  in  such  problems.  Because  of the farm debt crisis
and the accompanying danger of bankruptcy  facing many farmers,  such survival consid-
erations are now also of interest in developed agriculture  as well. For example,  Leathers
and  Chavas  have  recently  used  safety rules to justify government  intervention in U.S.
agriculture.  Robison,  Barry,  and  Burghardt have  shown that during  periods of financial
stress,  firms  may increase  borrowing  as a means  of forestalling  bankruptcy.  They char-
acterize  this  as "go  for broke"  behavior by highly  stressed borrowers.  The model  here
introduces  a safety rule in the agricultural  household production  model to demonstrate
similar  drastic  alteration  in  behavior  in  production  activity  that  can  take  place  with
financial  or subsistence constraints.
To  illustrate  this behavior  simply, consider a farmer  with a utility  function  U(-r,  T),
where  ir is income,  and  T =  - L is leisure time,  where L is total time and L is work
time.  Suppose  income is represented by  r  = pq - wx,  where p is output price,  q = fix,
L) is a production  function defined on input x and family labor L, and w is the price  of
x.  Finally,  assume  that  income  must  be  sufficient  for the  farmer  to meet  a  financial
obligation  D (a  constrained income  problem)  or that  the farmer  acts so  as to  first meet
an income level D sufficient  for subsistence  needs (a safety-first principle with respect to
household  consumption).  The farmer's problem can be formally stated  as
max{U(7r,  T)1  r  - D}.
After substitution for ir and  T, the Lagrangian  for this problem is
£ = U[pf(x, L) - wx, L-  L] + X[pf(x,  L) - wx - D],
which has Kuhn-Tucker conditions
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(5)  (pf  -w)(U  +  X)x= 0, x  ,
(6)  [pfL(Ur +  X)-  UT]L = 0, L >  0,  and
(7)  [pf(x, L) - wx-  D]X = 0,  X  >  0
where subscripts represent derivatives.3 Assuming  U,  > 0, condition (5) implies that either
x  =  0, or irx  = pfx  - w  =  0.  Similarly, the condition in (7)  implies that either X = 0,  in
which case the constraint is not binding, or X > 0, in which case the constraint is binding.
If the constraint is not binding, then one can determine  from the unconstrained problem
that dq/dp > 0 likely holds under normal conditions,  although supply may become back-
ward bending at very high prices as  the farmer becomes unwilling to work much at high
income levels  (Becker).
The interesting case is where x > 0 and the constraint is binding. In this case comparative
static analysis  of the two equations, pf  - w =  0 and pf(x,  L) - wx  - D = 0, yields
dL  f  dx  ffxL  -f  fL
dp  pf  dp  PfLfxx
so that
dq  dx  dL  fffxL  - fxfL  f
dp  dpdp  dp  PfL  f  P
If f  is  homogeneous  of degree  one,  then  the  elasticity  of substitution  is  a  = fxfL/ffL
(Ferguson, p.  96). If a <  1, then dx/dp  <  0 and dq/dp < -f/p < 0. Thus, negative supply
response  occurs under very reasonable  conditions. A farmer facing  a binding credit con-
straint will tend to substitute labor for leisure to meet obligations in periods of low price,
thus increasing  output.
Additional manipulation or simple intuition in this problem  shows that if the income
constraint becomes  binding, it does so below some critical  price level p0 which  depends
on the input price w. The slope of supply below p0 is thus negative,  while output supply
above p0 follows  the usual positive  slope  except  for possible  backward  bending  at high
income levels  because of the labor-leisure  tradeoff (Becker).
These results demonstrate how increased output may be induced by declining prices in
a period of credit crisis while increased output is also induced by increases in price above
normal levels.  For example,  suppose prices  fall, causing  a farmer to fall into  a liquidity
problem  such that credit  sources  are exhausted  and postponing  a financial  obligation is
impossible.  Then, if productive uses of labor can be identified, the farmer can try to meet
the obligation by working  more (or exerting family  members more)  than otherwise.  On
the other hand,  if prices increase,  financial obligations  may become less binding so that
family  labor allocation  will be  motivated by the usual unconstrained  marginal  income
considerations.
While the analysis here does not treat labor markets explicitly, it can be easily extended
to include  off-farm  labor markets.  In such situations,  financial distress  may lead family
members  with off-farm  work  potential to work  elsewhere  while  other family members
(children) take over farm labor activities.  This de facto extension of the labor supply tends
to drive down the rural wage rate,  creating  a secondary  effect of farm  output expansion.
Data for considering the applicability of this explanation are extremely limited.4 How-
ever, a recent study of 228 married farm women  in Yolo County,  California (Thompson,
Gwynn, and Sharp) found that women's participation in farming activities tends to increase
in times of economic adversity,  reflecting  "the need for the entire family to use its total
resources  for survival"  (p.  17).  These results do not confirm negative supply response but
they provide empirical support for the hypothesis that farm families tend to work harder
during  periods  of depressed  agricultural  prices.  Perhaps  some of the increased  labor is
used  to  substitute  for purchased  inputs.  These  observations  again  suggest that  supply
response tends  to decline  and possibly become negative in periods of recession.
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Poor Conservatism and Rich  Speculation
The third case of this article considers the role of risk aversion in output supply and how
it is affected  by booms and busts in agricultural  markets. Risk has long been established
as an important factor affecting farm decision making (Just).  Following the theory of risk
aversion advanced by Arrow, the degree of risk aversion depends on wealth. In particular,
Arrow  argued that decreasing  absolute risk aversion is more plausible than constant or
increasing absolute risk aversion. Also, Pope and Just have shown empirically that constant
relative  risk aversion  is more consistent with agricultural supply response than constant
absolute or constant partial relative risk aversion. Of course, constant relative risk aversion
implies decreasing  absolute risk aversion.  Thus, decreasing absolute  risk aversion is as-
sumed here,  which implies that risk aversion is higher with lower wealth.
Wealth, in turn, depends on average output price levels which are capitalized into land
values.  Thus,  agricultural booms  and busts influence  risk aversion.  In  a boom  period,
profits  are high  and  the  role  of risk aversion  declines  as wealth  increases,  resulting  in
normal positive response  to output prices.  In  a bust period,  land prices decline causing
wealth to decline  and risk aversion  to increase.  Just and Zilberman have extended  the
Sandmo framework  to demonstrate  that high risk aversion resulting from unusually low
wealth  can cause  negative  supply response.  This  occurs  because  the tendency  to avoid
risk may temporarily  overcome the desire for profit.
To demonstrate these results in a simple model, assume that output is produced with
multiplicative risk so that x = XE,  where x is actual output, x is expected output, and E  is
a random disturbance,  E(e) =  1. Suppose wealth  following production  is given by
W= px - C()  +  W0,
where p is output price,  C(x) is a cost function  defined  on expected  output,  and  W0 is
initial wealth. The farmer maximizes expected utility of wealth, E[U(JW)], through choice
of expected  output, which leads to the first-order condition
OEU
- E[U'(p  - C'] = 0.
Ox
To  examine  supply  response,  note  that  second-order  conditions  imply  d2EU/Ox2 =
E[U"(pe - C')2 - U'C"] < 0, which holds with risk aversion and convex costs, and that
comparative  static analysis  of the first-order condition implies
ax  E[U"(pE - C')X  +  U'E]
p  ~  E 2EU/dx2
When second-order conditions hold, this expression has the same sign as the numerator,
which is inconclusive.  The last numerator term, representing the expected profit effect,  is
positive. The other numerator term has two components.  One of the terms, EU"pxe2, is
negative and the other, -EU"C'xe, is positive. This suggests that supply is not necessarily
positively sloped under risk aversion.
A better understanding of conditions that lead to negative supply response  is obtained
by using a second-order  Taylor series  approximation  of the utility  function at expected
wealth,  W,
U'(W) =  U'(W)  + p(x  - x)"(W).
This allows the first-order condition to be approximated by
aEU
EU= U'(W)(p-  C') +  U"(W)E[p(x - x)(p  - C')] = 0.
Dividing by  U'(W), this condition is equivalent to
p  - C'  - bp
2 ,xa
2 =  0,
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where a2 =  V(E) and 0 is absolute risk aversion at expected wealth,
4(W)  =  - u,(,/u,().
Comparative static analysis of this equation and use of the second-order  condition yields
(8)  d  > (<) 0 as 1 +  C  Wa2S(r  t  - 2)  > (<) 0,
dp
where r is the elasticity of risk aversion, r  = -(O4/O  W)(W/¢);  S is the  share of expected
current revenue in expected wealth,  S = px/ W;  and 6 is the elasticity of expected wealth
with respect to price,  6 = (9W/dp)(p/W).
Equation  (8) demonstrates  that price  has  three effects  on  the  slope  of supply  under
uncertainty: a mean effect represented by the 1, a variance effect represented by - 20 Wa2S,
and  a wealth  effect  represented  by rS3f  WV2S.  The  mean effect  tends  toward positively
sloped  supply  as in the deterministic  case.  The  variance  effect,  however,  tends  toward
negatively sloped supply because an increase in price increases the variance of profit. The
wealth effect reflects the increase in absolute risk aversion as wealth  gets smaller.
To  determine  the overall effect  of price  on the  slope  of supply,  suppose that current
price  changes are  perceived  as short run in nature so  that expected  wealth  is relatively
unaffected.  Thus, 6 is small.  Note also that, according to Arrow,  relative risk aversion is
approximately  1, which  implies  that  qW is  approximately  equal  to  1, i.e.,  0  1/W.
Finally, note that 7r  approaches zero for near-constant absolute risk aversion. Under these
conditions, the term on the right-hand side of (8) approximates  1 - 22S. The interesting
aspect  of this  result is  that the  variance  effect  tends  to override  the  mean effect  when
wealth is small (S gets large), while the wealth effect becomes inconsequential  in the short
run.  Thus, the short-run response to a decrease  in price is an increase in output if wealth
is sufficiently  small.  And,  of course,  wealth  is small, approaching  zero for many farms,
in a bust period  such as the recent farm debt crisis.
Again, data for examination of this phenomenon are scarce. Very few published studies
have investigated  how risk aversion  varies  with wealth.  However,  Just and Zilberman
recently  have  shown  that negative  supply response  is plausible  with  low  wealth using
Roumasset's data on the distribution of returns among crops with levels  of risk aversion
found empirically  by Binswanger.
Conclusions
The analysis of this article has shown that supply may not necessarily have positive slope
for individual farmers.  Negatively  sloped supply may occur in the short run as  a result
of declining marginal  utility of income,  a safety-first  response  to a debt crisis, or a risk
averter's  response to a critical decline in wealth.  While each of these phenomena tend to
occur with  weak  agricultural  prices,  it is important  to recognize  that the circumstances
which  could  generate  negatively  sloped  supply depend  critically  on individual  circum-
stances (curvature  of utility,  debt-equity  levels, and  wealth).  Thus,  with heterogeneous
farm populations,  negatively sloped supply may be relevant for only certain segments  of
the farm population.  Therefore,  detecting negative  supply response  empirically may be
difficult  or impossible  with  aggregate  data.  Nevertheless,  the  forces  that tend  toward
negative supply response may have important impacts on aggregate  supply response and
cause the supply elasticity of agriculture to vary with economic conditions.
For example,  at  each point in  time,  the  distribution  of characteristics  among  firms
results in an associated  aggregate  supply elasticity.  When  this distribution places  larger
segments of the farm population in low income, debt crisis, or low wealth situations,  the
aggregate supply curve may have lower elasticity. Aggregation of individual firm responses
with these considerations  suggests three propositions about aggregate  agricultural supply.
First, the elasticity of aggregate  supply tends to increase with increases in prices, wealth,
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and  cash  flow  (after  debt  service).  Second,  the  elasticity  of aggregate  supply tends  to
decrease with higher interest rates. For example, an increase in interest rates reduces cash
flow  after debt  service,  which tends to reduce  supply  elasticity. Also,  because  discount
rates tend to be tied to interest  rates, an increase in interest rates tends to be associated
with a decline in the capitalized value of land which is farmers'  primary form of holding
wealth. Third, the elasticity of supply depends on the dynamics of land price adjustment
and the structure  of risk preferences.  Strengthening  land prices raises wealth and causes
more elastic supply, while weakening land prices lowers wealth and reduces  supply elas-
ticity.
[Received January  1989; final revision received July 1992.]
Notes
See Antle and Howitt, and Johnson and Quance  for a general discussion of fertility mining.
2 Comparative static analysis actually results in an additional term in equation (2) given by
1  02U  a2U  r,-T  I2
I  HI  OdAA 2 Arldr 2OP 1dA2
However, this term is zero by first-order conditions. That is, the first-order condition with respect to A2 implies
that either  OU/h7r2 = 0, or dT7r 2/A2 =  0 and OU/Odr 2 =  0 is unreasonable.
3 Note that L - L > 0 is assumed to hold for simplicity and realism.
4 The USDA collects data on off-farm income but they are not suitable for examining this phenomenon because
income  earned  by farmers from  working  on other farms  is included.  Thus,  the data  reflect  "reduced-form"
interaction  of demand and supply factors.  That is, in periods of weak agricultural conditions, the demand for
interfarm labor may decrease more than interfarm labor supply increases, so that off-farm income provides little
indication of the phenomenon of interest. An appropriate examination requires data on time allocation by farm
families.
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